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ABSTRACT 
This paper looks at the New Zealand experience of DNA profiling as 
evidence in criminal investigations. A brief description is first 
given of the process of DNA profiling, as well as techniques and 
laboratory procedures which are used. Next follows a discussion of 
the problems inherent in interpeting DNA profiles and the issue of 
admissibility. The developments in the UK, USA and Australia are 
described, followed by those in New Zealand, where the issue of 
informed consent has until very recently been especially relevant. 
The paper then 1 ooks at the way in whi eh DNA evidence has been 
challenged and the difficulties faced by defence counsel. Lastly the 
Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995, which has just come 
into force, is discussed. Particular attention is devoted to the 
arguments for and against the provisions for compulsion orders and 
the use of force. New Zealand has followed developments overseas with 
regard to DNA technology, but has taken the lead over countries such 
as the UK and Australia with regard to legislation to facilatate DNA 
profiling in criminal investigations. The conclusion is reached that 
the various benefits of this revolutionary new forensic tool should 
not cause one to adopt an uncritical approach to scientific evidence 
of this nature. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 15,600 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The techniques of DNA profiling have been hailed as "the most 
potentially far-reaching scientific advance to offer assistance to 
the criminal justice system since the development of fingerprint 
analysis. 111 This method of identifying an individual by analysis of 
their genetic material was discovered in the mid 1980s by Professor 
Alec Jeffreys under the rubric of DNA fingerprinting and made its 
first appearance in court proceedings in Britain in 1987. Since then 
DNA test resu 1 ts have been admitted in evidence in many er i mi na 1 
trials, particularly in Britain and the USA. 
In New Zealand DNA investigative techniques were introduced to 
criminal casework by the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research (DSIR) in 1989, and the first case in which evidence of DNA 
profiling was led was R v Pengell/. In 1992 the New Zealand Law 
Society promoted a travelling seminar
3 presented jointly by the 
prosecution counsel and the prosecution forensic expert witness from 
the Pengelly case. Both presenters, Lowell Goddard QC and Dr Margaret 
Lawton extolled the positive discriminatory powers of DNA profiling 
and its potential use as a forensic tool .
4 In 1995 the Criminal 
Investigations (Blood Samples) Act was enacted, and it was the South 
Auckland Rape inquiry which gave Parliament the incentive to get this 
legislation through. This Act, which came into force on 12 August 
1996, provides for compulsion orders to empower the police to take 
blood samples for the purposes of DNA testing, as well as the 
establishment of a DNA profile databank. 
In spite of the judicial acceptance of and general enthusiasm about 
I F r ec k e l ton " DNA Pr of ili ng: Forens ic Sci ence under the Mic ros c ope " 
(1 990) 
Cr i mi na l Law Journa l 2 3 . 
(1 992 ) 1 NZ LR 545 . 
L Goddard and M Lawton DNA Evi dence ( New Zea l and L aw Soc i ety , Ju l y-August 
1992 ). 
CA Pr i ce DNA Evidence: How Re l ,ab l e Is It ? ( Lega l Resear c h Foundat i on, Au
ck l and , 
1 994 ) 1. 
6 
3 
DNA profiling in New Zeal and, there has been intense scrutiny in 
other countries, especially in the USA, of problematical aspects such 
as the legal and scientific approaches to the courtroom presentation, 
control standards in laboratory procedures, the proficiency of those 
involved in the laboratory procedures and as expert witnesses, the 
techniques of declaring a DNA match, and the problems associated with 
statistical calculations. In New Zealand, the problems inherent in 
challenging DNA evidence, as illustrated in R v Penge77} and R v 
Doughert}, show that the i nevi table increase in DNA evidence in 
criminal trials as a result of the new Act has the potential of 
leading to miscarriages of justice. 
Part I I of this paper briefly describes the concept of DNA, the 
various techniques of DNA profiling and the procedures that are 
followed by the laboratories and technicians in New Zealand. Part III 
looks at the interpretation of DNA evidence. Part IV examines the 
first cases in the UK, USA, Australia and New Zealand and focuses on 
the issues of admissibility and informed consent. Part V examines the 
problems inherent in challenging DNA evidence. Part VI deals with the 
Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995 and the 
controversial provisions regarding compulsion orders, the reasonable 
use of force, and the establishment of a DNA prof i le databank. Part 
VII concludes the discussion. 
II ONA PROFILING 
A The Discovery 
In 1985 an epoch-making discovery by an English scientist, Prof Alec 
Jeffreys, made it possible to say that a particular bodily sample did 
or did not originate with a particular i ndividual . 7 Prof Jeffreys, 
Above n 2 . 
Unreported , Court of Appea l, 19 August 1996 , CA 2 3 / 96 . 
M Gelow,tz "DNA F1 ngerpr 1nt 1ng : What ' s Bred , n the B l ood " (1 988 ) Cr 1m1nal Reports 
122 . 
8 
9 
4 
a geneticist at the Unversity of Leicester in England, discovered 
that forensic science could use restriction fragment length 
polymorphion analysis ("RFLP"s) to identify the individual origin of 
biological evidence such a blood or semen based on their distinctive 
RFLP patterns. In collaboration with workers in the English Home 
Office forensic laboratory system DNA analysis was applied to 
forensic problems. Thus was established the forensic tool of DNA 
identification. 8 
People commonly use the terms DNA fingerprinting and DNA profiling 
interchangeably, but there are in fact separate approaches to 
identification. DNA fingerprinting is the term generally applied only 
to the method first developed by Alec Jeffreys in 1985. This 
procedure looks at many small regions (one region is referred to as 
a locus), and is alternatively called multi-locus analysis. Th i s 
technique is used in paternity and immigration cases by Cellmark, a 
British company which specialises in DNA testing and has adapted the 
Jeffreys technique commercially. Most forensic work, however, 
involves single-locus analysis, because results can be better 
controlled and interpreted, especially in instances of sample 
degradation. 9 
8 What is DNA? 
Everyone's DNA, with the exception of identical twins, has unique 
variations that can be used to estab 1 i sh identity. DNA is the 
substance deoxyribonucleic acid which is contained in almost every 
tissue and fluid in a person's body. DNA profiling is a method that 
utilises deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) to identify the derivation of 
trace biological evidence such as blood, semen, saliva, urine, hair 
(with root shaft attached) or skin. Therefore, forensic DNA profiling 
evidence has been used in cri mi na 1 cases for such purposes as 
identifying the remains of a victim, linking a suspect to a crime, 
ED Shap i ro and ML We i nberg " DNA Databank i ng: The Dangerous Eros i on of Pr i
vac y" 
(1 990 ) Cl eveland State Law Rev i ew 457-458 . See a l so above n 1, 23 . 
A We i ss " Easier to Exc l ude than to Ident i f y " ( 1990) Austra li an Law News 20 . 
10 
11 
5 
a~d exculpating a falsely accused suspect. 10 
Human cells contain within them all of the information needed to 
produce a complete human body. This human blueprint is carried in 
discreet packets of information known as chromosomes, and the 
material of which they are made is called DNA. There are 46 such 
packets within a cell and they can be arranged by means of common 
characteristics (such as their appearance under the microscope) into 
23 pairs. At fertilisation the ovum and sperm, each which contain 23 
single packets combine to produce the total of 46. Thus 50 per cent 
of the genetic information is of maternal origin, and 50 per cent is 
of paternal origin. This information is contained within its own 
chemical structure. DNA is made up of two intertwined strands of 
alternating phosphate and sugar units. The strands are linked by 
paired chemical complexes called bases, giving an overall effect 
rather like a twisted ladder. There are only four kinds of bases, 
known by their initial letters, A, G, C, T. These link up in base-
pairs, which correspond to the steps of a ladder across the molecule. 
The structure of DNA itself can also be envisaged as resembling a zip 
fastener where A, G, C and Tare the teeth of the fastener. Zips have 
two strands and so too has DNA, but unlike a zip, DNA will only close 
when A pairs with T, and G with C. The sequence in which these bases 
occur provides the information required to assemble and regulate the 
construction of the body, and is unique for every person and creates 
their genetic code. Allele is the genetic term which refers to the 
variations that occur in a region of DNA. 
C The Process of DNA Profj Ung 
The process of examining DNA samples is time-consuming, demanding and 
expensive, which explains why it is usually available as evidence 
only in serious criminal cases. The steps in the process of examining 
a sample are, in simplified form, the following: 11 
See above Shap i ro and We i nberg n 8 , 457-458 . 
B Robertson and GA Vignaux Interpret i ng Ev 1 dence . Eva 1 uat 1 ng Forens 1 c Sc , ence 1 n 
the Courtroom ( John Wil ey & Sons ( UK ) 199 5) 161 - 162 ; see a l so n 3 , 7-8 ; see a l so 
M Krawczak and J Schmidtke DNA Fingerprinting ( Bi os Sc i ent i f i c Pub li shers . London , 
6 
f Obtain sample 
The first step is to obtain a sample. In a criminal case it will be 
whatever can be found at the scene of the crime in whatever quantity 
and condition it can be obtained. The substances most commonly tested 
will be blood, semen, including spermatozoa, skin, saliva and hair 
follicles. Results can be obtained from samples as small as 0.01 ml 
of blood. Samples for criminal cases are generally taken using a 
medical examination kit so that the documentation and sample 
integrity is covered. Blood is collected into bottles containing an 
anti-coagulent. Criminal cases will have non-reference samples 
relating to the crime in question. They may be swabs of clothing from 
a sexual assault, bloodstains absorbed onto Cellotape or cotton 
cloth, hair or numerous other samples. 
f Extraction 
The sample is treated to extract the DNA molecules from protein and 
other cellular material in the sample and to purify it. DNA must be 
pure to give a good profile. 
3 Restriction 
In the older systems the DNA was treated with a restrichon enzyme 
or restrictfon endonuc lease. This cut the DNA into fragments at 
points at which a particular sequence of bases is recognised. If the 
DNA is not properly purified then cutting may be limited. 
4 Amplification 
Selected parts of the DNA can be made to replicate themselves. When 
this is done restriction is not carried out as the amplification 
process selects the desired parts of the DNA and ignores the 
remainder. Amplification is carried out by a cycle of heating and 
cooling in a primer solution which causes a chain reaction by means 
of short tandem repeat (STR) technology. 
5 Electrophoresis 
The fragments are placed in a gel and an electric current is run 
through it. The negative electrode is placed at the end of the gel 
where the DNA has been placed and the positive electrode is placed 
at the opposite end. This causes the fragments to migrate from the 
gel towards the positive electrode. The lighter fragments move faster 
1994) 1 7-22 . 
12 
7 
and whenever the process is stopped the fragments will be sorted by 
length. Electrophoresis takes up to two days. Samples of DNA from 
different sources are run through the gel in lanes next to each 
other. One of the lanes is usually a control lane - a sample of DNA 
from a known, unrelated source, such as a member of the laboratory 
staff. Care is taken not to have the crime stain sample next to the 
sample from the suspect. 
6 Southern blotting 
The DNA is then transferred from the gel to a nylon membrane by a 
process known as Southern blottinJ2. The fragments become fixed to 
the membrane, whi eh is easier to work with than the gel, in a way 
similar to the movement of ink onto blotting paper. 
7 Application of a probe 
A chemical probe is then applied. This is a piece of DNA of specific 
make-up which will identify and bind to particular sequences of 
bases. These probes used to be made radioactive so that their 
positions could be traced on an autoradiograph . Today, a luminescent 
chemical is more commonly used. 
8 Autoradiography 
In the past, an autoradiograph (also called an "autorad") was then 
developed by placing the membrane against an x-ray film and allowing 
a trace to develop. This took about 5 days. Today, luminescent 
chemicals allow the trace to be photographed immediately. The trace 
rough 1 y resemb 1 es a supermarket barcode and the number of bands 
depend on the particular techniques used. This is how an individual's 
unique DNA profile is recorded. 
9 Measurement 
The trace is examined and the position of the bands in the various 
lanes are measured accurately. Originally measurement was done with 
a ruler, but increasingly, computer devices are available. The 
positions of the bands correspond to the molecular weight of the 
components of the DNA marked by the probes. Some of the bands - those 
corresponding to the size-markers if they were used - are of exactly 
known weight. The process is now a matter of compar i son of the trace 
Named after i ts i nventor , Professor Ed Southern. See KF Kelly, JJ Rank in and RC 
Wink "Method and Application of DNA Fingerprin t i ng : A Guide f or the Non-Sc i ent is t " 
(1987) Crim L R 105. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
8 
sample with the control samples, the bloodstain with the blood of the 
accused, for example. In some cases, the bands wi 11 not match and 
there is an exclusion. This is overwhelming evidence that the two 
samples are not of the same blood. Where the bands seem to correspond 
in weight, more accurate measurements are needed and the difference 
in position between corresponding bases is measured. The measurement 
of bands is not a straightforward exercise. Band shifting can occur 
because of numerous factors including variable concentrations of DNA 
in the s 1 ots, vari ab 1 e temperatures or incorrect vo 1 tage at the 
electrophoreses step. For this reason, bands known to be from two 
samples from the same source may not necessarily be located at the 
same position on the autorad. When analysts declare that two bands 
"match" it means that they are so similiar in size that they cannot 
be distinguished under the procedure being used. 13 
D DNA Technology 
Techniques used in DNA analysis, in the words of Robertson and 
Vignaux, 14 "become obsolete faster than appeals move through the 
1 ega 1 system". The various systems that have been used and are being 
used follow below in chronological order. 15 
1 Multjlocus probes 
A multi-locus probe is the original type of probe developed by 
Professor Alex Jeffreys. 16 This is a probe which binds to several 
similar sequences of DNA and produces profiles composed of bands in 
a barcode pattern. There will be a number of bands and a dark blur 
at the end where the lightest bands congregate. Multi-locus probes 
give very high likelihood ratios but require a large amount of DNA 
to produce results. For a variety of reasons multi-locus probes are 
seen as likely to increase the risk of incorrect interpretation and 
Above n 4 , 7 . 
Above n 11, 163 . 
Above n 11, 163- 164. 
Above n 4, 9. 
17 
18 
19 
9 
a,-e not used for cr i minal i nvest i gat i ons . 17 
2 Single-locus probes 
A single-locus probe binds to only one part i cular sequence of DNA 
bases. It will produce a prof i le containing two bands only, unless 
the indiv i dual i s a homozygote, i e someone who has i nher i ted the same 
band from both parents, in which case only one band will be revealed. 
Single-locus probes are more sens i t i ve than multi-locus probes and 
therefore require far smaller quantities of DNA to produce a result. 
Because it is more sensit i ve the technician is also able to 
distinguish the elements in a mixed body fluid sample more easily .
18 
The disadvantage is that they produce relatively low discrimination, 
with results commonly being able to distinguish only one in hundreds. 
If there is enough DNA, this can be overcome by using a series of 
about 3 to 4 separate probes on the same sample and comb i ning the 
results. The DNA techniques involv i ng the use of probes to take 
"readings" from sect i ons of the sample , as decr i bed above, are known 
as Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP ) . 
3 PCR or Polymerase chain reaction 
This i s another term for ampl i f i cat i on. The earl i est PCR systems 
produced results on dot-blot tests , but s i ngle- and mult i -locus 
probes could also be used on PCR product, in wh i ch case the system 
was called AMP-FLP. The advantage of PCR is that amplif i cat i on i s 
poss i ble from degraded and minuscule samples of DNA. Th i s allows 
extraction of genetic informat i on from samples that conta i n severe 
DNA strand breakage, or too l i ttle cellular mater i al for any other 
genetic typing system. PCR is relatively s i mple to perform and the 
results can usually be obta i ned wi thin 24 hours, compared to days or 
weeks under the Southern blott i ng system. 19 
4 Dot-Blot tests 
These are test kits wh i ch produce very rapid results. The test ki t 
has a pattern of windows wh i ch either change colour or do not , 
indicating the presence of certa i n alleles. The di scr i mi nat i ng power 
of each of these tests i s low, but several comb i ned can produce hi gh 
Above n 4 , 10 . 
Abo v e n 4 , 10. 
Above n 4 , 11. 
20 
10 
likelihood ratios. 
5 HLA DQA. 1 
The genetic marker most commonly used in PCR / dot-blot processes 
examines a specif i c region of one chromosome conta i ni ng DNA for a 
chemical structure (a protein) called human leucocyte antigen HLA DQ. 
Scientists have identified six different forms of th i s chemical 
structure. These different chemical structures are called alleles. 
The six alleles are known as 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2,3, and 4, and each 
person has two of these a 11 e l es. 20 Each i ndi vi dual has two, 
determined by each of their pairs of chromosomes - a total of 21 
possible pairs. Once this specific region is amplified it is used to 
seek out control DNA on strips and if the individual has this 
specific protein then it will be indicated by a blue dye. Th i s 
technique gives a signal by the appearance of a coloured dot if the 
allele is present and no signal if the allele is absent. The 
discriminating power of this system is low in compar i son with multi-
and single-locus profiling. 
6 Mitochondrial DNA 
In addition to DNA in the cell nucle i every mammalian cell has many 
mitochondria and each mi tochondrion has its own copy of a different 
sort of DNA. Potent i ally th i s can be analysed even in mi nute degraded 
samples where the yi eld of DNA from the nucleus i s too sma 11 for 
conventional typing. Analysis of mitochondrial DNA has been 
successful on single shafts of hair and skeletons up to 3,000 years 
old. An example of its use was the recent identification of skeletal 
remains of the Russian Czar and hi s family. 
7 STRs 
Short tandem repeat (STR) loci are places where three to five base-
pairs are repeated several t i mes and the number of repeats may be 
different for different people. 
E DNA Techniques in New Zealand 
DNA test i ng was introduced to cr i minal casework i n New Zealand i n 
See a l so "Tests c a s t doubt on c on vic t i on " Sunda y Star - Ti mes , Mar c h 3 1 1996 , A4 . 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
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1989, by the DSIR, 21 and such testing continues to be done for the 
police, together with other forensic investigat i on work. A lengthy, 
systematic development plan was first carried out over a period of 
three years before DNA results were reported. The plan established 
and validated procedures, involved staff training and implemented a 
quality contra l program. 22 The DSIR has, however, now changed its 
name to the Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR).
23 
Until recently the single-locus probe technique has mainly been used 
to analyse samples for forensic purposes in New Zealand. This is a 
RFLP method which involves the use of probes to take "readings" from 
sections of the sample. Readings from different samples can then be 
compared. 24 Generally four to five single-locus probes are carried 
out ar:,d the combination of those results make up the "DNA profile 11 •
25 
The other method of analysis which is beginning to be used by the 
ESR, and wh i eh wi 11 be used for the databan k, is the polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) .26 This amplifies specific gene segments that also 
vary, but to a lesser degree than RFLPs. The main advantage of the 
PCR system is that it can been carried out with very small amounts 
of body samples. The ESR advised the Department of Justice that 
although each individual PCR test is less discriminating than the 
single-locus probe, a high degree of discrimination can be achieved 
using this method by repeating the tests a number of times targeting 
various sections of the DNA m~lecule. 27 Another advantage of the PCR 
New Zea l and Pol ic e Subm,ssion to the Just ic e and Law Ref'orm Se l ect Comm i ttee 12 
Apr il 1995 , 1. 
Above n 3 , 3 . 
A Crown research i nst i tute s i nce 199 2 . 
See above Part II D. 
Department of Just ice, Report to the Justice and Law Ref'orm Se l ect Comm i ttee , 1 
June 1995, 3 . 
See above Part II D. 
.Above n 25 , 3 . 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
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method is that it is cheaper than the single-locus probe. 28 
For a short while the ESR used HLA DQA. 129 tests, but because they 
were found to be too expensive and not discriminating enough, they 
were recently discontinued in favour of other PCR techniques. 30 
F Current Police/Laboratory Procedures 
Most blood samples taken for the purpose of DNA testing in relation 
to the identification of crime stains, are collected in Medical 
Examination Kits or a DNA Blood Sample Kit. The chain of evidence and 
security of sample/s placed in the kits are covered by the ESR 
protocol for blood sampling and storage in the laboratory. Each blood 
sample is assigned a unique number and it is this number that is used 
to identify the sample in the laboratory. 31 The ESR has adopted the 
"DNA Profiling Protocols and Quality Assurance Procedures" 
established by the US and Canadian Technical Working Group (TWIGDAM). 
These protocols and procedure provide minimum quality assurance 
standards for DNA analysis. Cameron Price comments that the existence 
of quality control and quality assurance protocols, coupled with the 
proposed evidential record sheets, should greatly assist with the 
general acceptance of the validity and reliablity of DNA profiles. 32 
The first sample to be obtained in an investigation results from a 
medical examination of the victim. This will establish the presence 
of offender DNA material on the victim. Blood samples may or may not 
be taken from vi et i ms 33 as part of medi ea l examination ( to 
distinguish the victim's DNA from the defender's). Where a sample is 
taken a protocol is completed by the medical practitioner and 
Interview with Ms Sue Vintner , scient i st at ESR, Auck l and , 22 October 1996 . 
See above Part II D. 
Above n 28 . 
Above n 28 . 
Above n 4 , 4 . 
Victims are encouraged to have such samp l es taken . See above n 28 . 
34 
35 
36 
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forwarded to the ESR in the Medical Examination Kit. 
The ESR examines swabs from a victim immediately to determine the 
presence of foreign bodily samples. Blood samples from a kit are 
analysed within a few days. This consists of blood grouping and the 
DNA testing itself. The results of the groups are written in a blood 
grouping record book which serves as a non-computerised database for 
all the blood samples received by the ESR.~ 
The Police, in conjunction with the ESR, have a formalised process 
relating to the destruction of blood samples at the end of a case. 
Once the particular trial is complete and/or the judicial process is 
at an end (i e when the time period for the filing of any appeal has 
elapsed) all blood samples, including those of the victim, but 
excepting the sample of the convicted offender, are destroyed.
35 
Limited situations exist where there might be "very good reason" for 
retaining samples after this point. An example occurred in the recent 
Court of Appeal decision R v Doughert;6 where the Court stated that 
(in a situation where the DNA evidence was neutral) if future 
refinements in DNA techniques did achieve better definition of DNA 
material, and that definition pointed away from the appellant ' s 
identification as the offender, justice would support further 
consideration of the case. 
Upon disposal, the ESR forwards a form (containing details of 
disposal) to a police station for attention by a particular member 
of police to enter into the police "docloc" system. 
Whole samples are not usually retained from previous enquires but the 
ESR does, as a matter of course, retain a sub-sample or aliquot from 
each person whose blood has been analysed, usually for blood grouping 
No names appear in the record book . The ana lyst ho l ds a li nkage between a b l ood 
reference number and an i nd iv idua l' s name . See above n 2 8 . 
Above n 2S , 2. 
Unreported , Court of Appeal, CA 277 / 94 . 
37 
38 
39 
40 
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only, in its laboratory. The aliquot is transferred to a piece of 
cotton cloth to be stored under frozen conditions as a blood stain. 
The ESR believes that the aliquot should be kept in the event that 
its evidence is questioned at a later date. It is, however, destroyed 
at the end of a case. 37 
DNA test results of reference samples are kept by the ESR together 
with the blood grouping results in the record book. A DNA record book 
was previously kept for each ESR laboratory in Auckland, 
Wellington, and Christchurch - but this has now changed as the 
analytical laboratory is to be in Auckland only.~ 
Autoradiographs (or "Autorads" negatives displaying the DNA 
profiles being compared) are also stored for each case. Each autorad 
will consist of DNA profiles from a blood sample, one or more of 
which may eventually be identified as coming from the offender, while 
some may be non-offender suspects or samples taken off the victim. 39 
G The ESR and the Crown 
As mentioned above, the ESR does DNA testing on behalf of the Crown. 
In a country as small as New Zealand, the limitations on financial 
and personnel resources preclude the possiblity of independent 
laboratories for DNA analysis for the purposes of criminal 
investigations. 
Cameron Price suggests that, in the light of the NRC report ' s40 
concern with high rates of false positives due to laboratory error 
as well as evidence that many forensic scientists who have testif i ed 
in American courts have been reluctant to acknowledge even the 
All genet i c i n f ormat i on and names of su s pects and v ic t i ms are removed at the en d 
of a c ase , and the reference samp l es are destroyed. See above n 28 . 
Above n 28 . 
Above n 21 , 3-4 . 
Nat i ona l Research Counci l, DNA Techno l ogy , n Forensic Science, Nat i onal Academy 
Press , Washington DC ( 1992 ). 
41 
42 
43 
44 
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possibility of false positive error, an ongoing series of blind, 
external, proficiency tests ought to be conducted under realistic 
conditions. In this way the rate of false positive error associated 
with a laboratory or an individual technician can be measured. He 
acknowledges that the limited economic and human resources could be 
said to justifiy the non-adoption of blind or open proficiency 
testing of laboratories and technicians, but points out that "with 
the virtual lack of local competition in DNA profiling services it 
is desirable, or even imperative, for such proficiency tests on the 
near-monopoly organisations to be conducted on a regular basis. 1141 
A prominent New Zealand scientist has voiced his concerns 42 that: 
1) the ESR does not normally allow independent scientists to 
review or criticise their work, and this precludes, therefore, 
true "peer review". 43 
2) the laboratories of the ESR are exclusively "employed" by 
the New Zealand Police, i e the Crown. 
3) crime scene samples and reference samples are kept in the 
same laboratory, and this exposes the ESR to the criticism that 
it is possible to 'dip' into a reference sample to achieve the 
desired result for the Crown. 
In the light of the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 
199544 , which now provides for blood samples requ ired for DNA 
profiling to be taken under compulsion orders, the considerations 
mentioned above are of considerable significance. Cases involving DNA 
evidence are bound to increase, and considering the implications for 
Above n 4, 14; see also SJ Young "DNA Evidence - Beyond Resonable Doubt?" (1991) 
Crim L R 266 who states:"To become accepted in both the scientific and legal 
communities, the technique of ONA prof i ling must not remain under the "secretive" 
auspices of research laboratories ... " 
Telephonic interview, Auckland, 7 November 1996. The scientist wishes, for 
professional reasons, not to be named. 
Access to ONA profiling by the defence is regulated by the "defence access 
protocol", devised by the police and the ESR. The ESR consider their internal 
qual ity assurance procedures to be sufficient and therefore expect the defence to 
accept their results. See above, n 42 . 
See below Part VI . 
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an accused if a positive result is reported by the ESR, it is of 
paramount importance that an expert scientist acting for the defence 
be allowed full access to and scrutiny of all records concerning such 
DNA profiling. It is also possible that the ESR may be urged in 
future to ensure that crime stain samples and reference samples are 
kept in separate laboratories. 45 
III INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE 
A Declaring a Match 
The first stage in the interpretation of DNA profiles is the 
dee la ration of a match. If two profiles that are compared do not 
match, then the suspect can be eliminated from the investigation. If 
the two profiles do match, then the significance of the match must 
be assessed through the calculation of a "match probability". For a 
variety of reasons, matching is not an easy process. A common problem 
at the matching stage is "band-shift". During electrophoresis two DNA 
samples which come from a common source may move through the gel at 
different speeds and this will produce two similar profiles, but all 
the bands in the one profile will be slightly higher on the autorad 
than the bands on the other. In such a situation the scientist will 
be tempted to ignore the discrepancy and declare a match. 
An even more serious problem, at the matching stage, is where one 
profile matches the other at several loci, but there are 
discrepancies in the number of bands between the two profiles. A 
scientist may decide to interpret some bands as "artefactual bands" 
i e as bands arising from problems in the preparation of the DNA 
profile rather than from genetic differences between the two samples. 
An example of this occurred in the English case, R v Oeen46 , 
demonstrating the subjective nature of DNA comparison. There may be 
Th i s wou l d be poss i b l e as the ESR has l aborator i es i n Auck l and , We lli ngton and 
Chr i stchurch , but i t has recent ly been dec i ded to have the ana l yt i ca l laborator y 
for ONA test i ng only i n Auck l and . See above n 28 . 
Court of Appea l, 21 December 1993 . 
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a considerable amount of human judgement involved and this means that 
a sc i entist who carries out the interpretation of a DNA profile makes 
dec i sions which are prejudicial to a defendant .47 
An accepted method of decid i ng when two bands are at the same 
position on a DNA profile has been a process called "match / binning " 
which involves declaring a match between two bands when they fall 
within a certain distance of each other - a "bin"- on the autorad . 
The use of bins to provide a rigid cut-off point is seen as 
artificial, as it is accepted that a scientist may decide to score 
a match even when two bands fall slightly outside a bin. However, 
tiny differences in band positions could t i lt the evidence from 
incriminating to excluding.~ 
It is also possible for gross error to occur dur i ng the process of 
preparing DNA prof i 1 es. For ex amp 1 e, i f samp 1 es are confused or 
mislabelled by the pol i ce or laboratory staff, scient i sts may end up 
comparing two samp 1 es from the same source i n a case where the 
suspect is not the perpetrator. In the Un i ted States some 
commentators claim that the few forens i c science prof i c i ency tests 
which have been published support the contention that false pos i t i ves 
occur in a s i gnificant number of cases. 49 
B Assessing the Significance of a Match 
Once a match has been declared the expert has to make a dec i s i on as 
to the significance of the match having occurred by chance. The 
finding of a "match", on i ts own, can be a piece of misleading and 
meaningless evidence. It can only make sense if the chance of a match 
in the general population i s compared. Sc i ent i sts therefore need some 
knowledge of the frequency wi th wh i ch the alleles represented on the 
autorad occur wi th i n a populat i on. A knowledge of stat i st i cal 
M Redmay ne " Dou b ts a nd Bu rdens : DNA Ev i dence , Probab ili ty an d th e Courts " (1 99 5) 
Cr im L R 46 6 . 
Abov e n 47, 467 . 
Abov e n 47 , 468 . 
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principles and population genetics is needed for this. The population 
geneticist determines the frequency with which a specific allele 
occurs within a given human racial group. The probability of 
coincidental matching is obtained from databases which determine the 
frequency of a DNA profile in the population. 50 
At the time when the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Bill was 
being considered, the Department of Justice was informed by ESR 
scientists that the probability of the profile of the crime scene 
sample matching the profile of a person other than the offender (a 
chance match) for single-locus profiles is typically reported as one 
in several millions. This has been determined on the basis of local 
population databases which have been compiled by the ESR. 
DNA studies have established that the frequency of particular bands 
being shared in the population varies between ethnic groups. This is 
particularly true of the highly sensitive single-locus probe bands. 
Some alleles are more common in some groups than in others. This 
affects DNA statistics. If a suspect is compared against their ethnic 
group, the likelihood ratio wi 11 probably decrease, because the 
denominator is likely to be higher if the bands are more common. For 
each of the single-locus probes to be used, the proportion of the 
different bands in the relevant populations must be determined. Once 
this is done, the probability of getting that band if the bloodstain 
came from a random member of that population can be used to determine 
a likelihood ratio. 
Robertson and Vignaux argue that a database drawn from the accused's 
racial group should only be used if a person from that racial group 
could have been the perpetrator if the accused were not. It wi 11 
therefore depend on what is known of the perpetrator. If nothing is 
known about the perpetrator a database drawn from the general 
population should be used. 51 
Above n 4, 1 5 . 
B Robertson and GA Vi gnaux Interpret , ng Sc 1ent i f' 1c Ev i dence Sem i nar of Auck l and 
Distr i ct Law Soc i ety (Auck l and , 17 October 1996 ) 4 . 
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C Baye's Theorem and the Likelihood Ratio 
DNA evidence attempts to establish the likelihood that, when a 
possible match is declared between the DNA profiles of a crime stain 
and of a suspect, the crime stain may have come from the suspect and 
not from some other individual. This evidence has to be weighed by 
the jury along with all the other evidence in the case and cannot be 
viewed as a certainty on its own account. 52 
The Bayesian probability theory, Baye's Theorem53 , which is based on 
the ability to quantify uncertainty, has found favour in the UK and 
New Zeal and al though it has not been adopted in cri mi na l cases in 
Australia and the USA. 54 Forensic scientists in New Zealand now 
present DNA evidence using this approach. Saye' s Theorem considers 
two or sometimes more alternative hypotheses. One view is that of the 
prosecution that the defendant committed the cr ime. The other view, 
that of the defence, is that he did not. The scient ific evidence will 
alter the odds in favour of the prosecution or the defence. Baye 's 
Theorem establishes that the odds after the scientific evidence are 
given by the odds prior, multiplied by a factor known as the 
"likelihood ratio 11 • 55 The likelihood ratio is calculated as: the 
probability of the evidence supposing the assertion is true, divided 
by the probability of the evidence if the assertion is not true. The 
probability of the evidence if the assertion is not true, is the 
denominator. When we divide them we get a single figure, a ratio 
which tells us the strenghth of the evidence in supporting our 
hypothesis. If the likelihood ratio is more than 1 the evidence tells 
in favour of the hypothesis. If the ratio is less than 1 the evidence 
tells against the hypothesis. 56 
Above n 4, 1 5 . 
Discovered by Reverend Thomas Bayes (1702 - 17 6 1). See above n 11, 17. 
Above n 4, 20. Price points out that the New Zealand Law Commission i ncorporated 
Bayesian principles i n the ir discussion paper on the proposed reform of the 
Evidence Act . 
Above n 3, 14. 
See al so n 51 , 3 . 
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Baye's Theorem also tells us how to update our knowledge by 
incorporating new evidence. We start with some knowledge about the 
hypothesis, expressed as odds in favour of it. These are known as 
prior odds. The prior odds (our assessment without the evidence) must 
be multiplied by the likelihood ratio of the new piece of evidence 
to give the posterior odds: 57 
prior odds x likelihood ratio-> posterior odds 
The prior odds are determined by reference to other evidence in the 
case and are hence a matter for the jury and not for the witness. The 
posterior odds are what the jury has to decide on before deciding 
whether to convict. The witness is concerned only with the likelihood 
ratio. 58 An expert scientist giving evidence of DNA profiling cannot 
assess the probability that the accused was present or that an event 
occurred. The witness can only give a likelihood ratio for the 
evidence on the basis of the hypothesis. 59 
In a recent English case, R v Adams60 the prosecution gave evidence 
of the results of a DNA test in the form of a likelihood ratio. The 
jury were then instructed by the defence as to the method of 
combining that evidence with all the other evidence in the case by 
applying Baye's Theorem. This method was accepted prev i ously by the 
Lord Chief Justice in R v Deen. 61 
Cameron Price does not share Robertson and Vignaux's enthusiasm for 
Baye's Theorem. He feels that to attempt to reduce all evidence to 
a numerical weighting is misguided and must be discouraged before it 
becomes adopted as a standard. He states that it is the function of 
the judge and jury or judge-alone to weigh the evidence and decide 
on guilt or innocence. Statistics will continue to have a part to 
Above n 4 , 22 . 
Above n 5 1, 6 ; see a l so n 11, 16- 21. 
Above n 51 , 8 . 
Referred to by Robertson and Vi gnau x, above n 51 , 10 . 
CA , 2 1 December 1993, 
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play in separate items of evidence but should not be an attempt to 
solve the ultimate issue by combining all evidence into mathematical 
terms. He has no quarrel with the fact that the ESR has shown a 
preference for presenting DNA profile evidence in the format of a 
likelihood ratio but insists that: " .... the combination or 
multiplication of those separate weightings by expert witnesses with 
a s t at i s t i c a l be n t , h as n o p l ace i n o u r l e g a l s y s t em " . 62 
IV DNA EVIDENCE AND THE COURTS 
A The First Cases 
In October 1987 a man was convicted in Birmingham Crown Court of a 
rape committed a year earlier. The press described this as the first 
time that DNA fingerprint evidence had been given in a British court. 
However, the first practical application of this technique in the 
criminal context is believed to be the case of Pitchfork. 63 In this 
case DNA evidence was used not only to exculpate someone but also to 
find the guilty person. Two girls were raped and murdered in 
neighbouring villages in Leicestershire. The police believed that a 
17 year old youth was responsible for both murders. DNA evidence 
demonstrated that although the same person was responsible for both 
murders, since semen found on both bodies had the same DNA 
fingerprint, the accused was not the person. The DNA fingerprint 
obtained from his blood did not match that obtained from the semen. 
He was released after three months in custody. 
The police, believing a local man to be responsible, asked all male 
inhabitants of the area between 13 and 30 years of age to give a 
blood sample for DNA fingerprinting. A total of five and a half 
thousand people did so. Colin Pitchfork persuaded a workmate to 
substitute his own blood sample but this information soon reached the 
Above n 4 , 24. 
RM Wh i te JJD Greenwood "DNA F 1ngerpr 1nt 1ng and the L aw " ( 1988 ) The Modern L aw 
Rev i ew 148 . 
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police. Pitchfork eventually gave a blood sample, apparently 
voluntarily, and this produced a DNA fingerprint identical to that 
produced by the semen samples. Pitchfork pleaded gu i lty to both rapes 
and murders and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Prior to his 
deception coming to light the police admitted that despite 7,300 
statements, 25,000 computer entries, and a $20,000 reward, they had 
no leads. If DNA profiling had not been available the original 
suspect might have been wrongly convicted and Pitchfork would have 
escaped detection.M 
Since late 1987 many cases have come before the English and American 
courts. While Pitchfork was the first criminal case in which DNA 
fingerprinting was employed, the first conviction obtained solely on 
the basis of a DNA fingerprint occurred in the United States. On 6 
November 1987 Tommie Lee Andrews was convicted of aggravated battery, 
sexual battery and armed burglary of a dwelling, on the basis of 
evidence, supported by two experts' testimony, that his DNA 
fingerprint matched that produced by a semen sample recovered at the 
scene. Less than a week later the first English conviction to result 
from DNA fingerprinting was secured when Robert Melias pleaded guilty 
in Bristol Crown Court to the rape of a 43 year old disabled woman. 65 
B Admissibility of DNA Evidence 
1 Other countries 
In the criminal courts of the USA there has been widespread use of 
DNA profiling. With a few exceptions the courts have endorsed DNA 
testing and admitted the results in evidence. 66 In making this 
determination most American courts relied on what is known as the 
Above n 63 , 1 5 0 . 
Above n 7 , 1 30 . 
Above n 25 , 4 . 
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"Frye test". 67 The application of this test means that before the 
results of a scientific discovery can be admitted into evidence the 
re 1 i abi 1 i ty of the discovery has to be accepted by most experts 
working in that field. Over 30 "Frye" hearings on the admissibility 
of DNA evidence have been held throughout the United States and with 
rare exceptions the courts have found that DNA testings meet the Frye 
criteria. Juri sdi cti ons that have scrutinised DNA evidence most 
carefully before allowing its presentation to the jury have usually 
applied a "three-prong " Frye test, of which People v Castro68 is an 
example. Prong one of the Frye test asks: "Is there a theory, which 
is generaly accepted in the scientific community, which supports the 
conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable results?" 
Prong two asks "Are there techniques or experiments that currently 
exist that are capable of producing reliable results in DNA 
identification and which are generally accepted in the scientific 
community?" Prong three asks: "Did the testing 1 aboratory perform the 
accepted scientific techniques in analysing the forensic samples in 
this particular case?" In a number of jurisdictions the traditional 
two prong Frye analysis for DNA admissions, which was more lenient 
toward the admissibility of DNA, was employed. In such cases expert 
testimony to the effect that generally acceptable DNA testing 
procedures were not properly performed in the specific case at hand 
is treated as bearing on the weight that the jury should accord to 
the DNA evidence.w 
The case of People v Castro70 established that the theory underlying 
DNA profiling is generally accepted by the scientific community and 
that the current techniques for carrying out profi 1 i ng procedures are 
also generally accepted as capable of giving reliable results. 
CC Shank " DNA Ev i dence , n Cr i mina l Tr i a l s" (1 99 1) Ar izona Law Revi ew 848 ; see 
a l so JS Kotva l "Pub li c Po licy for Fo rens ic DNA ANa lys is: The Mode l o f New Yo rk 
State " ,n PR 8 ill ings (ed ) DNA On Tr , a l 112. 
545 N . Y . S 2d 985 (N . Y . Sup . Ct . 1989 ). 
DA Gass and MM Schultz "An Ana l ays,s of Dec isi ona l Law Govern i ng the Use of DNA 
Ev i dence ( As of January 1992 )" i n PR Billi ngs ( ed) DNA on Tria l 44 . 
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The principles established in Castro were confirmed in the first USA 
Federal Court of Appeal's decision on the admissibility of DNA 
evidence, namely US v Jakobetz. 71 In that case it was held that a 
court could properly take judicial notice of the general 
acceptability of the theory of DNA and the use of specific DNA 
profiling techniques. Si nee then, in Daubert v Merre 7 7 Dow, 72 it was 
held that the Frye test has been superceded by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence 1975, which imposes a less exacting test as to 
admissibility. 73 
The general position of English law as to the admissibility of 
scientific evidence is that there is no special test or threshold 
issue requirement applicable to the determination of admissibility. 
The evidence need only meet the traditional requirements of relevance 
and helpfulness. In England and Wales, therefore, it is for the court 
to decide whether the field of learning has or has not developed to 
such a point that it is one upon whi eh a person of appropriate 
qualification can give expert evidence. The way in which this is done 
is very much up to the individual judge. The current position in 
English law is to subject the expert witness to cross-examination, 
put up a defence expert to contradict the evidence if possible, and 
leave it to the jury to decide the value of the evidence. This 
approach has the disadvantage of prejudicing and confusing the jury 
by the parade of scientific evidence. 74 
In Australia the approach, as shown in the case of R v Tran75 , is 
that technical errors by forensic scientists affect not weight, but 
admissibility. In this case there were a number of problems in the 
DNA evidence with regard to the management of the tests, their 
( 1992) U. S . App LEXIS 322 ; see a l so n 3 , 2 6 . 
11 3 S.Ct . 2786 ( 1993 ). 
See Ru l es 402 , 401,702 . The Supreme Court sa i d the F r y e test was i ncons i stent wi th 
Federa l Ru l es , and shou l d therefore not be app li ed i n federa l tr i a l s . 
P All dridge " Recognis i ng Nove l Sc i ent i f ic Techn i ques : DNA as a Test Case " (1 992 ) 
Cr i m L R 692 . 
(1990) 50 A Crim R 233 . 
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accuracy and the population genetics, and this led the judge to 
conclude that to admit the evidence would have been to invite the 
jury to speculate. 76 
2 New Zealand 
(a) Prima facie admissible 
In New Zealand the case of R v Penge77y17 established that, prima 
facie, DNA evidence is admissible for evidential purposes. 
Notwithstanding the prima facie admissibility of DNA evidence, its 
admissibility in any particular case, or the weight to be attached 
to it if established, may depend upon whether the reliability factors 
listed above have been established to the court's satisfaction. Prior 
to 12 August 1996, when the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) 
Act 1995 came into force, admissibility also depended on other 
considerations, such as whether a suspect's blood sample was lawfully 
and voluntarily obtained in the first place by the law enforcement 
agency concerned. 78 
In every case it is for the judge to rule on the admissibility of DNA 
evidence and to instruct the jury on how the evidence should be 
treated. The legal position is essentially the same as for the 
reception of other forensic evidence. 79 Cameron Price has made the 
interesting comment that New Zealand has, in its judicial acceptance 
of DNA profiling, largely ignored the critical debate on and intense 
scrutiny of the validity and reliability of the procedures and 
assumptions forming part of DNA profiling and its interpretation. 80 
(b) The issue of informed consent 
Above n 74 , 692 . 
Above n 2. 
Above n 3, 26 . 
Above n 25, 4 . 
Above n 4 , 1 . 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
26 
The Criminal Investigation (Blood Samples) Act 1995, which came into 
force on 12 August 1996, provides for the police to apply for a 
compulsion order in the case where a person suspected of certain 
offences refuses to supply a blood sample for the purpose of DNA 
testing. 81 
Prior to 12 August 1996 the taking of blood samples depended on 
informed consent. If such consent was not obtained, the results of 
any DNA profiling resulting from the sample would not be admissible. 
This issue was dealt with in two cases, namely R v Monte11J2 and R 
v Penge77}3. In Montella a very prescribed and limited consent was 
given for a specific purpose only. This was on the advice and through 
the medium of the accused's defence counsel. In Pengelly a general 
consent was sought and given to the provision of bodily samples for 
the purpose of forensic examination within the context of a homicide 
inquiry. The issues of informed consent were therefore different in 
the two cases. 84 
In R v Montella the central dispute was whether consent to DNA 
testing had been given at all. Blood samples were taken from a man 
who was accused of having anal intercourse with an 11 year old boy. 
It transpired later that the accused's counsel had advised him to 
provide a blood sample only for the purpose of AIDS testing. It was 
therefore held that the accused had not consented to a medi ea l 
examination for general forensic purposes in the context of any 
criminal charge he might face. The DNA evidence was therefore held 
to be inadmissible. 
In R v Penge11}5 defence counsel argued that the blood sample taken 
from the accused during a medical examinat i on at the police stat i on 
See above Part VI. 
( 199 1) 7 CRNZ 258. 
Above n 2 . 
Above n 3 , 35 . 
Above n 2 ; see a l so n 3 , 35. 
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was not obtained by an informed and voluntary consent. The accused, 
a 17 year old youth, agreed to provide a blood sample and fingernail 
scrapings and was under no misapprehension as to the context in which 
the police request for forensic samples had been made of him. Defence 
counsel argued that although the accused was asked for his consent 
he was not informed of his right to grant or withhold his consent, 
and that the implications of DNA testing were not explained to him. 
The Court of Appeal held that sufficient information had been given 
to the accused to make it obvious that the purpose for whi eh the 
blood samples were being requested from him by the police was to 
ascertain whether or not they would match bloodstains found at the 
scene of the homicide. 
The decision in Pengelly has been criticised by WJ Brookbanks86 who 
argues that the Court of Appeal failed to recognise the unique 
character of DNA as a form of forensic analysis. He feels that 
because of the probative and inculpatory nature of DNA profiling, the 
accused person ought to be fully informed as to the possible outcome 
of sample analysis, as well as his right to refuse to consent, before 
consent to the procedure is given. 
In future, however, the issue of informed consent will no longer be 
an issue because of the provisions concerning compulsion orders in 
the new Act. 
V CHALLENGING DNA EVIDENCE 
A The Initial Reaction 
The initial application of DNA technology to criminal investigations 
in 1987 had a dramatic impact. The spectacular nature of the 
investigation leading to the conviction of Colin Pitchfork in 1987, 
coupled with the enthusiasm of the companies which were set up to 
market the technique, caught the imagination of both the police and 
WJ Brookban ks "DNA Prof i 1 i ng and Informed Consent 1 n Cr 1 m1 na 1 Invest 1 gat 1 ons " 
(1992) NZLJ 125. 
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the press. The often faint, fuzzy and di started bands produced on 
autoradiographs were likened to the precise and unambiguous patterns 
of supermarket bar-codes. The process was stated to be incapable of 
yielding a false match. Defendants confronted with DNA evidence 
"rolled over" and pleaded guilty. In the United States it was sa i d 
that "everyone just sort of lay down and died 11 •87 This was followed 
by a period in which prosecution experts were cross-examined but no 
defence experts were called. Such efforts were understandably lacking 
in success. 
In 1990 Andrew Ha 11 wrote that "there appears to be a feeling on the 
part of [English] lawyers that the accuracy of DNA fingerprinting 
makes it a waste of time and effort to try to challenge positive 
identification 11 , 88 and he commented that the result of the Australian 
case R v TraJ9 had particular relevance for such lawyers, not least 
because the evidence in Tran was again prescribed by Cellmark 
Diagnostics, one of the two organisations conducting DNA profiling 
in England. And in 1992 Peter Alldridge stated that in England, 
" ...... what appears to have happened is that the mere mention of DNA 
evidence for the prosecution has generated guilty pleas" . 90 David 
Farrington commented that "This country [England] has been remarkably 
lax in its examination and questioning of DNA evidence within the 
criminal court system. DNA has been allowed a mystique which is 
undeserved. 1191 
It is also believed (or rather, feared) that lay jurors may be overly 
influenced by laboratory tests and scientific jargon, and that they 
are not able to properly combine the statistical evidence with all 
the other evidence in the case. Most lawyers are hardly qualified to 
N Mc l eod " Eng li sh DNA Ev i dence He l d I nadm i ss i b l e " (1 99 1) Cr im Law Rev i ew 58 3. 
A Ha ll " DNA F i ngerpr i nts : Bl ack Bo x or Bl ac k Ho l e? " (1 990 ) 
N.L. J . 20-204, 213 at 204 . see a l so n 87 , 384 . 
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Above n 74, 688. 
D Farr i ngton "Unacceptab l e Ev i dence" ( 1993 ) New Law Journa l 806 . 
92 
93 
94 
95 
29 
properly assess and challenge DNA evidence, and yet they need to have 
a clear appreciation of the contentious points to be able to cross-
examine an expert and challenge aspects such as the testing 
procedures and band matching. 92 It is also widely known that there 
is a disparity in the resources available to the defence to challenge 
scientific evidence. 93 
8 Other Countries 
1 People v CastrJ4 
Castro's case in the USA was the turning point. This case represented 
the first serious challenge to the validity of DNA profiling 
evidence. In this case Jose Castro, a 38 year old Hispanic, was 
accused of murdering his neighbour and her two year old daughter. 
Both victims were stabbed to death. A small bloodstain on Castro's 
watch was analysed by Lifecodes Corp. which reported that the DNA bar 
code pattern from the blood of one of the victims matched that on the 
watch. Four of the expert witnesses represent i ng both the prosecution 
and defence met to review the sci enti fi c evidence after they had 
already testified. The result of the meeting was a two page consensus 
statement that addressed the inadequacy of the scientific evidence. 
The court applied a three-pronged test to determine the Frye 
standard, and held that the DNA evidence failed the third prong of 
the test and that the evidence was therefore inadmissible, "since 
testing laboratory failed in several major respects to use generally 
accepted scientific techniques and experiments for obtaining reliable 
results within reasonable degree of certainty 11 • 95 
v Hammond ONA Evidence , LLM Res e ar c h paper , Vi ctor i a Un iver si t y o f We lli ngton , 
199 1, 40 ; see a l so n 67 , 86 7 . 
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2 R v TraJ6 
In Australia lawyers were also initially nonplussed by the new 
evidence. After the extraordinary events in Castro, however, the 
first challenges emerged. In 1990 the admissibility of DNA evidence 
was unsuccessfully challenged in New South Wales in R v Elliot~7 and 
in Tasmania in R v Brown98 . In both cases the defence called experts 
qualified to give evidence on DNA profiling techniques and statistics 
but lacked an expert in statistic interpretation of population 
genetics. Finally, in R v TraJ9, heard in the New South Wales 
Supreme Court in October 1990, the challenge to the admissibility of 
the prosecution evidence was successful. 
The Tran case involved the rape and murder of Sandra Peresan in 1988. 
The police arrested a Vietnamese man, Van Hung Tran. Samples were 
sent for DNA profiling to Cellmark Diagnostic in Oxfordshire and 
these included three marginal swabs and one blood sample from the 
body of the deceased and blood samples from the deceased's boyfriend 
(who was with her when she was attacked and had just before had 
sexual intercourse with her) and Tran. These samples were subjected 
to four separate tests, each being a distinct "single-locus" probe. 
The defence ea 11 ed a number of expert witnesses who successfu 11 y 
challenged the prosecution DNA evidence on three bases; firstly as 
to the manner in which the profiling techniques were actually 
excuted, eg concern was expressed at the running of the suspect and 
the crime scene samples in adjacent gel bases; secondly, on the 
interpretation of the results obtained in respect of whether the 
track containing the crime scene sample contained two extra faint 
bands matching those of the accused or only one; and thirdly that the 
interpretation of the results had relied upon statistical data for 
Afro-Caribbeans in calculating the chance of a match with the accused 
Above n 75. 
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where there had been identification evidence that the offender was 
Oriental. Such was the disagreement and uncertainty between the 
experts on the second point that no jury could really be assisted at 
all by the DNA evidence and the court therefore ruled it 
inadmissible. Tran was convicted on the basis of other evidence led 
by the crown. 
However, Tran's case, following on from Castro, made it clear that 
DNA evidence can be challenged. The disagreement among experts from 
Cellmark and those appearing for the defence as to appropriate 
procedures and safeguards showed the need for agreed scientific 
standards with regard to DNA profiling. lOO 
C New Zealand 
1 R v Pengell) Ol 
R v Pengelly was the first case in which evidence of DNA profiling 
had been led in a criminal trial in New Zealand. The accused, who was 
17 years old, was convicted of the murder of a 77 year old woman. The 
vi et i m' s home had been entered via a louvre window, and she had 
received multiple injuries from being beaten and stabbed. The 
accused's finger and palm prints were found on the louvre windows, 
and there were also blood stains at various places in the house that 
were sufficient for analytical purposes. A sample of blood was 
obtained from the accused and subjected to DNA profiling. The 
strength of the Crown case depended on much more than the DNA 
evidence. The DNA profiling was done by Dr Margaret Lawton of the 
DSIR who gave evidence that the results she obtained from the autorad 
showed that it was 12,450 times more likely that the blood originated 
from the accused than if it had originated from someone else. 
102 
After Pengelly was convicted the expert scientist for the defence, 
Above n 3, 28 . 
Above n 2 . 
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Dr Arie Geursen, filed an aff i davit stating that, in his opinion, the 
DNA profile results prepared by Dr Lawton were very poor in quality 
and should not have been admitted at the trial. Prior to the trial 
Dr Geursen visited the DSIR laboratory, perused the complete file of 
working data, 103 and viewed the autorad containing three different 
crimestain blood samples (Exhibit C) obtained from the kitchen floor 
and from a net curtain inside the murder victim's house. The defence 
counsel, Mr Murray Gibson, then sought orders under s 389 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 to appoint Prof Alec Jeffreys (the pioneer of the DNA 
profiling technique) as an assessor to assist the Court. Prof 
Jeffreys was not able to come to New Zealand but he made a report on 
Exhibit C. His opinion was that the quality of the DNA profile was 
very poor and he stated that to his knowledge, evidence of this 
degree of poor quality had never been admitted in any United Kingdom 
Court! At Prof Jeffrey's suggestion, and on the basis of further 
advancements in sensitivity of the DSIR ' s own DNA profiling 
techniques, Dr Lawton carried out further analyses of the crimestain 
blood samples from the kitchen floor and net curtain. These results 
were infinitely clearer and were forwarded to Prof Jeffreys for 
examination and comparison with Exhibit C. This resulted in a further 
report from Prof Jeffreys. He commented that the new profiles were 
of a quality fully compatible with that obtained by other forensic 
laboratories and that the DNA profiles from the curtain stain and 
from the accused were indistinguishable throughout the track. He 
cone 1 uded that "the results of the new ana 1 yses carried out by 
Margaret Lawton estab 1 i shes beyond any reasonab 1 e doubt that the 
blood samples obtained from the kitchen and from the curtain 
originate from Penge 11 y." These 1 ater tests and affidavit of Prof 
Jeffreys were admitted at the appeal. 
The significant point in this case is the fact that Exhibit C was of 
a quality so poor that it should not have been admitted in evidence. 
Yet, as the court did not know this, it was accepted as positive 
evidence to support the Crown's case. There would have been no 
This i s an except i on to the ru l e . The f il es of the l aborator y are not norma ll y 
made ava il ab l e to i ndependent sc i ent i sts act i ng for the defence. Informat i on from 
Dr Ar i e Geursen, te l ephon i c i nterv i ew , 8 November 1996 . 
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~bjection to th i s evidence i f i t had not been for the intervent i on 
of the expert scientist called by the defence counsel. 
2 R v Doughert) 04 
New Zealand ' s most dramat i c and public i sed case involving DNA 
evidence, R v Dougherty, turned around the difficulty of the defence 
counsel to exculpate the accused or to establish reasonable doubt. 
It is also a case in which scientific ev i dence of the ESR almost went 
uncha 11 enged. On 20 August 1996 David Dougherty was released from 
prison after serving three years of his seven years and nine months 
jail sentence wh i eh was i mposed on him in June 1993 . He had been 
found guilty of abduct i ng and rap i ng an 11 year old gi rl in West 
Auckland in October 1992. The reason for hi s release was a Court of 
Appeal decision to quash his convictions and order a retrial 
(scheduled for February 1997105 ) i n the l i ght of scient i fic 
interpretations which contradicted the one which was put before the 
court in the prev i ous appeal. 
In the first court case a sc i entist from the ESR, Ms Susan 
Petricevic, gave evidence that she exam i ned s i x swabs in the med i cal 
examination kit as well as a pair of pyjama pants and underpants worn 
by the complainant, and found sem i nal fluid only on the i tems of 
clothing. The amount was, however, i nsuff i cient for DNA prof i l i ng. 
Dougherty was convicted on the ev i dence of the compla i nant . 
The complainant stated that she was awoken in her bedroom early in 
the morning by a person whom she recognised as her neighbour by hi s 
voice . She was gagged and blindfolded and taken to a nearby open area 
where was was raped. She said that the bl i ndfold slipped suffic i ently 
to allow her to see the assa i lant ' s face for about 20 seconds. 
Dougherty was seen by the pol i ce the next morn i ng and he was adamant 
that he had stayed home on the ni ght i n quest i on. He not only agreed, 
but was in fact very eager, to prov i de the pol i ce wi th bod i ly 
Unreported, Court o f Appeal, CA 23 1/96 . 
Interv i ew wi th de f ence c oun s e l, Mr Mu rray Gi b s o n, Au ckl an d, Nov e mb e r 1996 . 
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~amples, declaring that he was sure that tests would establ i sh that 
he was not the offender. 
Shortly after the trial, in September 1993, Dr Peta Stringer informed 
Crown counsel that a new DNA technique ea 11 ed DQA-1 had been 
introduced into laboratories of the ESR in New Zealand and could give 
results for samples which previously had too little DNA to analyse. 
Defence counsel was informed and samples that had been obtained from 
both the complainant and appellant were retested by the ESR. Dr Peta 
Stringer carried out the analyses on DNA samples from the 
complainant's pyjamas and underpants, and from the swabs taken from 
her by the doctor who examined her the fo 11 owing afternoon and 
completed the sexual assault kit. 
In October 1994 Daugherty ' s appeal was heard by Justices Eichelbaum, 
Gault and Thorp. The defence team, consisting of Simon Lockhart QC 
and Robin Brown, relied on the new evidence consist i ng of Dr 
Stringer ' s report. Dr Stringer reported the results of the DNA on the 
underpants as being 1. 2, 3, *4, where *4 meant "The 4 a 11 e le detected 
was very weak. The signal intensity of the reactions obtained for 
alleles marked with the aster i sk(*) are such that they do not fulfil 
the criteria required for a positive result as la i d down by the 
manufacturer of the chemical kit used to perform these analyses. The 
explanation of results given however takes the presence of these weak 
alleles into account because of laboratory experience." Her report 
went on to claim that the DNA on the underpants could have been 
contributed to by two or more persons who would include the appellant 
(whose genotype is 1.2., 4) but not the compla i nant ' s (1.2, 2). The 
Court dismissed the appeal, relying heav i ly on Dr Stringer's findings 
of DNA matching Daugherty ' s type without advancing any theories as 
to the presence of a third person ' s DNA on the garment: 
As we assess the results of the additional tests, they certainly do not reduce 
the factors linking the appel l ant to the offending, b ut rather po i nt the other 
way : and the fact that one of a number of tests has l ocated DNA from some 
th i rd party on one of the complainant's garments, without more , cannot be said 
to have such cogency as to Justify our vacat i ng the Jury's verdict. 
Quite by chance, on the day the judgment was delivered, a lawyer, Mr 
Murray Gibson, and a scientist, Dr Arie Geursen, happened to be at 
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the High Court and heard about the case. 106 Dr Geursen was concerned .. 
about the scientific evidence, as he felt that DNA evidence could not 
at the same time point in the direction of the appellant and away 
from him. He subsequently got hold of a report of the judgment to 
find out the details of this evidence, and he and Mr Gibson decided 
that they wanted to do something about what they considered to be a 
miscarriage of justice. Further legal aid was refused, but both Mr 
Gibson and Dr Geursen decided to work on this case without 
remuneration. 107 Although ESR scientists do not normally allow 
independent scrutiny of their work, Dr Stringer allowed Dr Geursen 
to inspect her file on the case. He found that he disagreed with her 
findings. A test on the underpants showed a result corresponding to 
genotype 1 .2, 3. Allele 3 could not have come from Dougherty or the 
complainant. 
In September 1995 Dr Geursen dispatched photos of the test strips to 
two international experts in the DQA testing technique, namely Dr 
Stephen Gutowski at the Victoria Forensic Science Centre in Australia 
and Dr Rebecca Reynolds, section manager of the Human Identity Group 
at Roche Molecular Systems in California. 108 Dr Gutowski reported 
that in his opinion there is no irrefutable genetic evidence to link 
Dougherty with any of the material typed in this case. There is 
reliable genetic evidence to implicate another person, not being 
Dougherty. 109 Dr Reynolds said in her report: "The contributor of 
the seminal fluid stains in the victim's underpants and pajamas is 
a person with a DQA1 type of 1 .2, 3. The appellant cannot possibily 
be the source of the stains because his type is 1. 2, 4." She al so 
stated that the weak 4 signals reported by Dr Stringer were not 
reliable indicators of the presence of additional alleles.
110 
Mr Gibson and Or Geursen had been defence counsel and expert witness respectively 
in the Pengelly case. See above Part V C 1. 
Above n 105. 
Or Reynolds offered her services free of charge and the fees of Dr Gutowski were 
paid by Mr Gibson himself. See above n 103. 
Affidavit by Stephen Gutowski, 25 July 1996. 
Affidavit by Rebecca Reynolds, July 26 1996. 
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Mr Gibson tr i ed to have the case reopened and approached the 
Governor-General, supporting the appl i cation with affidav i ts from Dr 
Gutowski, Dr Reynolds, and Dr Geursen. In hi s af fidav i t, 111 Dr 
Geursen critic i sed the interpretat i on reported by Dr Stringer and 
stated that in his opinion the results of her work excluded Dougherty 
as having contributed to the seminal stain on the underpants and 
pyjamas. 
The Court of App ea 1 he 1 d that the tot a 1 i ty of the ev i dence now 
available gave a materially different picture from that considered 
by the court in 1994, and that a new trial should be held. "We 
consider it is essentially a jury task to evaluate all of the 
evidence previously given in the light of the scient i f i c ev i dence now 
available." Dougherty was granted bail and was released from prison 
after serving three years of a seven years and ni ne months sentence. 
VI THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS {BLOOD SAMPLES) ACT 1995 
A Background 
Until the Criminal Invest i gations (Blood Samples) Act 1995 ("the 
Act") came into force on 12 August 1996 the police had no specific 
statutory authority to obtain body samples for DNA testing . The 
Police Act 1958 allows the police to take "part i culars " of any person 
who is in lawful custody and who has been charged with an offence, 
but such "particulars " do not include blood samples. In the absence 
of express statutory authority , the legality of tak i ng a blood sample 
therefore depended entire 1 y on consent . 112 
In 1978 the Crim i nal Law Reform Comm i ttee i ssued a report entitled 
"Bodily Exam i nation and Samples as a Means of I dent i f i cat i on " . It 
recommended a statutory procedure enabl i ng a pol i ce off i cer to apply 
Dated 2 6 Ju ly 1996. 
K Dawk i ns " Cr1 m1na l In v e s t 1gat 1o n s ( B l o o d Sampl es) Act (1 9 96) NZ L aw Revi ew 31. 
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to a judge for an order authorising the obtaining of a sample of 
blood, saliva, hair, nail clippings and scrapings, and fingerprints 
from a suspect. The proposals attracted some interest, but were not 
enacted. 113 In early 1988 the Criminal Investigations Bill was 
introduced but because of considerable opposit i on it did not proceed 
very far through the legislative process. In 1992 the then Minister 
of Police, John Banks, put forward a proposal to enact legislation 
empowering the police to take blood samples for the purposes of 
forensic testing. This proposal resulted in the reinstatement of the 
1988 Criminal Investigation Bill. 114 In 1994 the Government agreed 
to the addition of provisions relating to the establishment of a DNA 
databank for defined law enforcement purposes. 115 The eventual 
enactment of the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995 was 
made possible by the renewed interest in DNA testing as a result of 
the South Auckland Rape Inquiry ("Operation Park"). 116 The Act only 
came into force on 12 August 1996, and the delay was due to the fact 
that administrative regulations first had to be prepared for the 
police and forensic experts. 117 
The Act has three principal purposes. Firstly it codifies procedures 
that wi 11 govern the taking of b 1 ood samp 1 es by consent for DNA 
analysis. This part of the Act formalises existing practices and 
procedures, although there is now a detailed prescription of the 
particulars that must be conveyed to a suspect who has been requested 
to provide a blood sample. Secondly the legislation provides for the 
police to obtain a blood sample from a person who is suspected of 
having committed a certain type of offence and to use that sample for 
the purposes of confirming or disproving that person's involvement 
N Trendle "DNA , The Modern F 1ngerpr 1n t " 1n FWM McE l rea ( ed ) Re-th1nk1ng Cr , m,na l 
Just , ce vo l I I , May 1 995 , 7 . 
Above n 4 , 36-37 . 
Above n 25 , 1. 
Above n 1 12 , 3 1; See a l so Hansa Reports , Par li amentary debates on the Cr , m,na l 
Invest 1 gat 1ons ( Bl ood Samp l es ) 6 111 : 12 Oct 1994 , 9- 1 0 August 1995 and 29 Nov 
1995 . 
Tel ephon ; c ; nterv , ew w, th l ega l adv 1 ser of the Department of Just 1 ce, 20 March 
1996 . 
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in the commission of the offence. Thirdly it authorises the 
establishment of a databank of DNA profiles for use in the 
investigation of crime. 11 8 
During the passage of the legislation the Justice and Law Reform 
Committee received 22 submissions on the bill. The main topics of 
comment were the following: 1) Reliability of DNA testing; 2) 
Individual Rights); 3) Use of Force and 4) Scope of Databank. 119 
8 Reliability of DNA Testing 
There were four submissions to the Justice and Law Reform Committee 
on the issue of the underlying reliability of DNA analysis. Dr Andrew 
Dowsett 120 stated that the accuracy of DNA analysis is unknown and 
subject to extensive scientific debate. He acknowledged that DNA 
profiling can be a powerful tool but suggested that the bill appeared 
to give "genetic fingerprint i ng" legal standing beyond that which is 
warranted by the sci enti fi c merits of the technique. Dr Dowsett 
pointed out that New Zealand is clearly a follower in the development 
of this technology as most of the pioneering research on the use of 
DNA profiling is going on in England and the United States. For this 
reason it is "ill-advised" for New Zealand to take leadership instead 
of being a follower of international legal trends. 
The New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties121 raised concerns about 
the interpretation of sample results and the possibility of conflicts 
between expert witnesses, and the Auckland Council for Civil 
Liberties 122 pointed out that it is an investigative tool with 
l i mi tat ions to its validity and reliability. The ESR stated that 
Above n 11 3 , 7 . 
Above n 25 , 1. 
Subm1ss1on to the Just , ce and Law Reform Comm,ttee , 16 January 1995 , 3. 
The New Zea l and Counc il for Ci v il Li bert i es , Subm 1ss1on to Justi c e and Law Reform 
Se l ect Comm,ttee , 1- 2. 
The Auck l and Counc il for Civi l Li bert i es ( Inc ), Subm1ss 1on to the Justice and Law 
Reform Committee , 6 March 1995 , 2 . 
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although DNA profiling results are not definitive, they do provide 
a very high level of corroborative evidence. 
The Department of Justice made i t clear, however, that the bill did 
not affect the admissibility of DNA evidence per se or provide any 
legal standing for it in the trial context. The major purpose of the 
bill was to provide a regime that allowed the police to obtain blood 
samples for analysis in certain defined circumstances. Although this 
implicitly acknowledges that there is considerable value for law 
enforcement purposes in obtaining such evidence, the bill did not 
determine the weight that should be ascribed to DNA evidence in 
general or in any particular case. 123 
C Compulsion Orders And The Use Of Force 
1 The statutory provisions 
Section 13 of the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 
provides for an application to be made to a High Court Judge for an 
order requiring a suspect, who is of or over the age of 17 years, to 
give a b 1 ood samp 1 e. There must be "good cause to suspect that the 
suspect has committed a relevant offence" (subsection (1)(a)), and 
the suspect must have refused to consent to the taking of a blood 
sample (subsection (10(b)). Section 16 provides that a High Court 
Judge may make a "suspect compulsion order" requiring the respondent 
to give a sample of the respondent's blood if he is satisfied that 
certain requirements are met. These include the fact that there is 
"good cause to suspect that the respondent has committed the re 1 evant 
offence (subsection (1)(a)), that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that analysis of a blood sample taken from the respondent 
would tend to confirm or disprove the respondent's involvement in the 
commission of the offence (subsection (1)(c)), and that in all the 
circumstances "it is reasonable to make the order" (subsection 
(1)(e)). Section 23 provides for a similar compulsion order in the 
case of a suspect who is between 14 and 17 years of age. 
Above n 25, 2; see also Part III B 2 . 
, 
124 
125 
126 
40 
Section 54 sets out the procedure for taking a blood sample pursuant 
to a compulsion order. The person from whom the blood is to be taken 
has a choice of whether he wishes to have the sample taken by way of 
a venous sample or a fingerprick sample (subsection (1)(a)). He is 
al so to be informed of what wi 11 happen should he ref use to have a 
blood sample taken (subsection (1)(b)). Should the person refuse to 
allow a blood sample to be taken in accordance with the compulsion 
order, "a member of the Police may use or cause to be used reasonable 
force to assist a medical practitioner to take a fingerprick sample 
from that person" (subsection (2)). 
2 New Zealand's first compulsion order 
On 25 September 1996 Justice Sir Graham Speight ruled in the High 
Court at Auckland that a 21 year old Western Springs man had to give 
a blood sample to see whether he was involved in a vicious robbery 
in January 1996. 124 Police believe that the man took part in a 
robbery of the Bayou Cafe in Richmond Rd, East Lynn, in the early 
hours of Janury 14 1996. The man had previously refused to supply 
blood voluntarily for comparison with the blood found at the cafe. 
This was the first time that the Act has been used to compel a supect 
to provide a blood sample since it came into force on 12 August 
1996. 125 On 17 October 1996 police made criminal history when they 
had to use force, sanctioned by the new legislation, to put the 
compulsion order into effect. The suspect had refused to cooperate. 
It is interesting to compare the experience of Victoria in Australia, 
where the police have not yet had to use force, 126 with the 
experience of New Zealand, where the very first compulsion order had 
to be carried out with the use of force! 
3 Legislation in other countries 
"Tak i ng Bl ood Samp l e Makes Hi story" New Zea l and He r a l d , Au ckl and , 18 Oc tober 1996 , 
A3 . 
"Judge a 11 ows force i n taking b 1 ood ", New Zea 1 and Hera 1 d , Auck 1 and , 26 September 
1996 . 
See be l ow Part VIC 3. 
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Overseas precedents are mixed. In the United States authority to 
obtain blood samples is usually obtained by application for a search 
warrant or court order. In many state jurisdictions case law permits 
reasonable force to be used in the execution of such an order or 
warrant. 127 
In Australia the state of Victoria has since 1989 had legislation 
providing for the police to use reasonable force to obtain a blood 
sample if there is a refusal to comply with a court order. 128 The 
information received from Victoria is that on no occasion has the use 
of force been required to ensure compliance with a court order. 129 
It is possible that other Australian States may adopt the Victorian 
model. A draft Model Bill for Forensic Procedures1~, which provides 
that reasonable force may be used to enable procedures such as the 
taking of a blood sample to be carried out, was recently released for 
public comment by the Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General . 131 
In the UK section 63 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(PACE) distinguishes between intimate and non- i ntimate samples and 
provides that intimate samples (which include a sample of blood) may 
only be taken with the consent of the person and that force may not 
be used to take such samples. 132 Section 63(10) makes provision for 
the drawing of an adverse inference at any subsequent criminal 
Department of Just ice, Br iefing Paper to the Justice and Law Reform Committee, 2 
March 1995, 3. 
Cr imes (Blood Samples) Act 1989. See above n 25, 12. 
Department of Just ice, Br iefing Paper to the Justice and Law Reform Select 
Committee, 13 April 1995, 2; cf New Zealand's first compulsion order, see Part VI 
C 2. 
No timetable for consideration of the Model 8111 has been set by the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General. 
Above n 127, 3. 
In Scotland the taking of samples from the body of a suspected or accused person 
is almost wholly based on common law. Where consent 1s refused, a warrant for the 
taking of a sample can be obtained from a sheriff. This 1s believed to achieve a 
satisfactory ba lance between the interests of the suspect and the interests of the 
public and the v1ct1m. See HM Adv v Milford 1973 SLT 12; see also Scottish Law 
Comm, ss1 on discussion paper no 80 Evidence: Blood Group Test, DNA Tests and 
Related Matters , December 1988. 
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proceeding in the event of a refusal, without good cause, to give an 
intimate sample. Under section 64, non-intimate samples may be taken 
without consent by the police (only after arrest), and reasonable 
force may be used to obtain such samples. 1~ 
Canada has no legislation authorising the taking of blood samples 
from suspects. This is because the Supreme Court of Canada has 
characterised the taking of a suspect's blood in the absence of full 
and informed consent as unreasonable search and seizure. This is due 
to the impact of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedom. 134 
4 Arguments for and against the provisions 
a) Abrogation of rights? 
Seven submissions to the Select Committee commented on the 
application of the New Zeal and Bi 11 of Rights Act 1990. It was 
alleged that the provisions allowing compulsion orders and the use 
of force were inconsistent with various sections of the Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. Compliance with the following rights were queried: 
Section 11 Right to refuse to undergo medical treatment. 
Section 21 Unreasonable search and seizure. 
Section 23 Rights of persons arrested or detained. 
Section 25 Minimum standards of criminal procedure (especially 
subsection (d) The right not to be compelled to be a 
witness or to confess guilt). 
b) The Department of Justice's reply 
Upon the request of the Select Committee, the Department of 
Justice135 commented on the submissions which queried the 
See also n 4 , 37 . 
New Zea l and Law Soc i et y, Subm1ss ; on to the Just ice and Law Reform Se l ect 
Comm;ttee , 9 March 1995 , 3 . 
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implications of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. The report pointed out 
that section 7 of the Bi 11 of Rights Act requires the Attorney-
General to bring to the attention of the House of Parliament any 
provision in any bill which appears to be inconsistent with the 
rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights Act. The Crown 
Law Office assists the Attorney-General in his functions under 
section 7 by vetting Justice bills. A section 7 report was not made 
in the case of the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Bill. 136 
In assessing whether a bill is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights 
Act, the first stage is to determine whether any of its provisions 
prima facie breach a particular right or freedom. If there appears 
to be such a breach, section 5 is invoked, namely that the rights and 
freedoms in the Bill of Rights can be subject only to such 
"reasonable limits prescribed by law, as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society". The test applied was 
outlined in Ministry of Transport v Noort, Police v Curran137 , and 
this approach shows that the rights and freedoms in the Bi 11 of 
Rights Act are not absolute. 
With regard to section 25(d), the Department of Justice pointed out 
that there was no prima facie breach because the right of an accused 
not to be compelled to testify aga i nst him or herself in criminal 
proceedings does not include the right to resist a lawful 
investigative power to obtain incriminating evidence. 138 
The Department of Justice expressed doubt as to whether the right 
contained in section 11 of the Bill of Rights Act was affected by the 
provisions of the bill because case law has not yet determined the 
issue of whether "medical treatment" is involved in the taking of a 
blood sample. 139 
Above n 25 , 6 . 
( 1992 ] 3 NZLR 260 . 
Above n 25, 10. The c ourts i n other c ountr i es have c ons i stent ly refused to extend 
the r i ght against self-incr i minat i on to evidence obtained f rom body samp l es . 
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Section 21 provides that "Everyone has the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the person, property or 
correspondence or otherwise". In R v Jefferies14D Richardson J 
stated the following: "Whether the intrusion is "unreasonable" 
involves weighing all relevant policy considerations and their 
applications in the particular case". It can therefore be argued that 
the intrusion may be reasonable and therefore not constitute a breach 
of section 21. 
Section 23 protects the rights of persons arrested or detained. In 
Po 7 ice v Smith and Herewi n ; 141 Richardson J expressed doubt as to 
whether the submission to a blood sample being taken (under section 
580 of the Transport Act 1962) constituted a detention. Section 23(5) 
provides that "everyone deprived of liberty shall be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the person". 
As the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act makes provision 
for the court to issue a warrant to detain a person until the blood 
sample is taken in accordance with a compulsion order, this would 
qualify as a "deprivation of liberty". However, such a person would 
be entitled to the protection in section 23 of the Bill of Rights 
Act. 
If there is a prima facie breach of sections 11, 21 and 23 of the Act 
(and it can be argued that there is no such breach, as shown above), 
the question is whether the limitations can be justified under 
section 5. The State interests that must be weighed up against the 
privacy and dignity interests of individuals include the prosecution, 
detention and efficient investigation of crime. The Department of 
Justice also pointed out that the bill contained a number of features 
which ensured that the interference with an individual's rights was 
minimised. 142 
c) Alternative measures? 
[1 994 ) 1 NZLR 290 . 
Unreported, 10 December 1993 , Court of Appea l , CA 42 / 93 , CA 109 / 93 . 
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Several of the submissions opposing the use of force suggested 
alternative measures to the use of force. One option mentioned was 
the adverse inference which a court or jury can draw from a refusal 
to submit to the taking of a blood sample, as is the position in the 
UK . 143 Another option that was suggested was to create a specific 
offence for failing to provide a blood sample. 144 
Both the alternatives suggested for the use of force would defeat the 
purpose of the relevant provisions. The option of a specific offence 
would offer the suspect the easy choice of punishment for the lesser 
offence of non-compliance rather than taking the risk of imprisonment 
for the substantive offence. 145 The adverse inference option is 
inadequate because the sanction would only apply to those people who 
are subsequently charged with an offence despite there being no DNA 
evidence. It has not al ways been pass i b le to proceed with an 
investigation or to trial without DNA evidence. 146 
d) The degree of intrusion 
It has been argued that the taking of a blood sample, even by the 
fingerprick method, is more intrusive than the forcible taking of 
fingerprints. Dr Rodney Harrison, President of the Auckland Council 
for Civil Liberties, considers the use of physical force by agents 
of the state to extract evidence as "torture". 147 On the other hand, 
it can be argued that the fingerprick procedure is the lowest level 
Eg Doctors for Sexual Abuse Care, Subm1ss1on to the Just,ce and Law Reform Select 
Committee, not dated, 2 ; Auckland District Law Society Publ ic Issues Committee , 
Subm1ss1on to the Justice and Law Reform Select Comm,ttee, 28 February 1995, 6 . 
Eg YWCA , Subm,ssion to the Just,ce and Law Reform Select Comm,ttee, not dated, 5; 
Auckland Council for Civi l Liberties, Subm1ss1on to the Just ice and Law Reform 
Select Comm1ttee, 6 March 1995, 6 . 
Above n 113, 2 and 1 0. 
Above n 25, 14. 
R Harrison "DNA, The Modern Fingerprint. Commentary . What's Your Problem? It's 
Just a Prick" in FWM McElrea (ed) Re-th inking Criminal Just1ce vol II (Legal 
Research Foundation, 1995) 28. He likens the thumb prick by force to the medieval 
thumbscrew! 
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of intrusion possible148 and ought to be able to be carried out with 
minimal force, minimal intrusion and minimal discomfort and 
humi 1 i at ion to the suspect. 149 It has been compared to two other 
statutory provisions which provide the police with ways of 
determining identification, and also allow, if required, reasonable 
force to be used. These are section 57 of the Police Act 1958 and 
section 17 of the Penal Institutions Act 1954 which provide for the 
taking of photographs, fingerprints, palm prints and footprints. 150 
e) Refusal and serious offenders 
The Department of Justice suggests that on the basis of current 
experience there is perhaps i nsuffi ci ent evidence to show that 
serious offenders in fact escape conviction because of a refusal to 
provide a blood sample. There may also only be a small number of 
cases where the police would have sufficient evidence to obtain a 
court order, but have i nsuffi ci ent evidence to 1 ay charges if a 
suspect refused to comp 1 y with the order. 151 
The New Zealand Police, however, believe that the use of reasonable 
force is pi vota 1 to the success of the 1 egi s 1 at ion. 152 The reason is 
that without this provision it would be advantageous for an offender 
to neither consent to a police officer's request nor to comply with 
the Judge's order to give a blood sample. If the absence of DNA 
profi 1 i ng means that there is i nsuff i ci ent evidence to support a 
charge, such an offender may even be able to avoid a trial. If there 
is sufficient evidence, the jury may do no more than draw an adverse 
Because venous samples have been ru l ed out . Seen 25 , 14. 
Above 11 3, 1 0 ; 1 4 
New Zealand Po l ice Assoc i at i on , Subm1ss1on to the Just,ce and Law Reform Select 
Comm,ttee, February 1995, 3 . 
Above n 25, 14 . 
New Zealand Police, Report to the Just , ce and Law Reform Select Comm,ttee, 1 June 
1995, 1 . However , in R vMart,n ( 1991) 7 CRNZ 296 the court he l d that no i nference 
may be drawn from an accused's refusa l to prov i de a b l ood samp l e; it should be 
seen as an express i on of his lega l r i ght to prevent interference with his personal 
liberty(!) 
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inference from the refusal to supply a blood sample. 153 
The following examples were put forward to i llustrate how crucial DNA 
related evidence can be: 
* In R v Montella, 154 in which a suspect was prosecuted for 
the sexual violation of a 12 year old boy, Williamson J refused 
to admit evidence obtained through DNA analysis on the grounds 
that the accused had only consented to a blood test for the 
purposes of AIDS testing but not for DNA analysis. 155 
* In R v Pira156 a prosecution was only made poss i ble because 
of the availability of DNA analysis. In the course of the 
investigation into a robbery and rape, a request for a blood 
sample was made of three suspects. Two prov i ded a sample but 
Pira refused . More than a year later Pi ra agreed to prov i de a 
blood sample when he was i nvolved in a car ace i dent. The 
analysis that followed prov i ded suff i c i ent i dent i f i cation 
ev i dence to have Pira charged with aggravated robbery and rape. 
It might be mentioned that the c ircumstances i n wh i ch Pi ra 
later agreed to prov i de a blood sample can only be descr i bed 
as extremely fortuitous . Wi thout that blood sample there would 
have been no case. 157 
* Yet another example mentioned by the pol i ce 158 i s a case 
where a woman was confronted by an i ntruder i n her home and 
raped after her hands had been t i ed . The person suspected by 
the police was asked to prov i de a blood sample but refused on 
the advice of hi s sol i c i tor. Although there i s other 
Above 11 3, 2; 9 . 
(1 99 1) 7 CRN Z 258. 
New Zea l an d Po l i ce , a bo ve n 152 , 1. 
Unrepor t ed , 9 December 199 2 , Cou r t of Ap p ea l, CA 328 / 92 . 
Above n 15 2, 3 . 
Above n 15 2, 2 . 
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circumstantial evidence which points towards this suspect as 
having committed the offence, the police believe that in the 
absence of DNA profiling there is i nsuffi ci ent evidence to 
charge him. Facing the prospect of a long term of imprisonment, 
should DNA profiling confirm his identity, the suspect has no 
reason either to agree to giving a blood sample or to comply 
with a judicial order requiring him to give it. 159 
In the face of police evidence that serious offenders escape 
convi et ion because of their present right to refuse to provide a 
blood sample, it seems obvious that the ability to use reasonable 
force is the most effective way of ensuring that a sample is in fact 
obtained pursuant to a court order. It can also be argued that the 
ability to use force should act as a potent incentive for suspects 
to comply with a court order, in which case force will not have to 
be used. 160 
5 Public interest v the civil libertarian view 
In spite of considerable opposition, the provisions allowing for 
compulsion orders and the reasonable use of force were included in 
the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995. The civ i l 
libertarian view that "the traditional balance between citizen and 
the State is being manipulated in favour of the State, at the expense 
of privacy and bodily integrity" 161 , was therefore not upheld and 
the view that favoured the public interest won the day. The latter 
view was reflected in a newspaper editorial at the time when the Act 
was passed, and included the following: 
Parliament cons i dered the l egis l at i on l ong and hard , and has struck the ri ght 
balance . It is on l y common sense to give po li ce the ab ili t y to use what may 
prove to be the most s i gn i f i cant advance i n c r i mi na l i nvest i gat ive techn i ques 
since the advent of f i ngerpr i nting. Those who c arp against i t r i sk being s een 
as more concerned with protect i ng offenders than i n d e li ver i ng J ust ic e to 
Above n 1 13 , 9. 
See experience of Victor i a, Austra li a, above Part VI , C 3 . 
Above n 121,4 . 
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their past victi ms and protection to their future targets. 162 
D The Scope of the Databank 
1 Primary object 
The primary objective in establishing a databank of DNA profiles is 
to enable the police to match profiles obtained from body samples 
found at the crime scene with profi 1 es in the databank, thereby 
having a good chance of identifying the offender concerned. There 
are, however, also secondary justifications. 163 It will ass i st in 
the early elimination of suspects whose profiles on the databank do 
not match the offender's. It may also act as a crime prevention tool. 
Knowing their DNA profile is on the databank may act as a significant 
deterrent preventing people from committing serious offences. 
2 DNA profile databank 
Part III of the Act makes provision for the taking of blood samples, 
either by consent or compulsion from certain convicted offenders, for 
a databank in which the DNA profiles of those persons will be stored 
for law enforcement purposes. The description "DNA Profile Databank" 
makes it clear that the database will contain only DNA profiles and 
not the genetic material from which they are der i ved. 164 The 
legislation is confined to the taking of blood samples, as the advice 
from the ESR is that blood remains the most suitable bodily material 
for DNA analysis. The Institute's advice is that in order to 
efficiently and accurately match a suspect's DNA profile with a body 
samp 1 e taken from a crime scene, it is necessary to have a b 1 ood 
sample of reasonable quantity from the suspect. Other body samples 
(such as hair or saliva) which might be obtained from a suspect are 
Editorial, The D0m1n1on, 23 October 1995. 
Above n 152, 2. 
Above n 112, 25 . 
165 
166 
50 
not considered as satisfactory substitutes for blood . 165 
Two categories of profiles may be stored on the databank: 1) any 
profile derived from a blood sample obtained by consent or compulsion 
under Part I I where the suspect has been convicted of a relevant 
offence, being either the offence in respect of which the sample was 
taken or a "related" offence as defined in section 2(2); and 2) any 
profile derived from a blood sample taken by consent or compulsion 
under Part III. With regard to the second category there are two ways 
in which a blood sample may be obtained for the purposes of deriving 
DNA profiles for storage on the databank. Firstly the police may 
request any person aged 17 years or over to consent to giving a 
sample. In such a case the procedure is similar to that applicable 
to suspect requests under Part II, except that a databank request is 
not related to a specific offence and there need be no ground for 
suspecting that the person requested has been involved in the 
commission of any offence. Secondly, where any person of whatever age 
is convicted of a relevant offence, the police may apply, at the t i me 
of sentencing, or at any time within 6 months of conviction, for a 
"databank compulsion order" requir i ng the convicted person to give 
a blood sample. 166 Special provisions apply where databank 
compulsion orders are sought in relation to persons under the age of 
17 years. 
For the purposes of Part III of the Act, "relevant offence" includes 
not only the serious crimes listed in Part A of the Schedule, but 
also burglary and entering with intent which are separately specified 
in Part B. These two less serious offences were added because 
evidence was presented in committee that 94 per cent of persons 
convicted of intruder rape have previous convictions for burglary 
and/or entering with intent. Where a person's DNA profile is stored 
in the databank the profile is not admissible in evidence against 
This is so even with the new techniques, such as PCR , which allows more discrete 
analysis of smaller quantities of body mater i al. See also n 127, 1- 2. 
On 27 November 1996 a databank compulsion order was made in the High Court in 
Auck land in respect of a 17 year old youth who is serving a four year sentence for 
aggravated robbery. This is probably the second order of its kind under the new 
Act as it is be lieved that the first order was in fact recently made in Whangarei . 
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that person in any criminal proceedings, except where the profile is 
derived from a blood sample taken from a suspect and the proceedings 
are for the offence in relation to which the sample was taken. This 
means that a DNA profile may be used for investigative purposes, but 
if a profile is to be used in a prosecution, a further blood sample 
will be required. A DNA profile may however be used in evidence in 
any application for a compulsion order. 167 
The Act recognises the right of any non-offender, by written notice 
to the Commissioner of Police, to withdraw his or her consent under 
Part III to the use of any blood sample for the purposes of obtaining 
a DNA profile. The Commissioner must then ensure that the sample and 
profile are destroyed as soon as practicable. As a further safeguard, 
the annual report of the police must also include the total number 
of DNA profiles stored on the databank for the period under review, 
together with a breakdown i ndi cat i ng whether the prof i les were 
obtained by consent or compulsion order. Even so, the retention of 
non-offender DNA profiles is a matter that warrants continuing 
l e g i s l at i v e i n v i g i l at i on . 168 
3 Recommendations by the Privacy Commissioner 
Recommendations by the Privacy Commi ssi oner169 to the Justice and 
Law Reform Committee led to the limitation of access and disclosure 
of DNA profiles. Access to and disclosure of the profiles is confined 
to the following purposes: forensic comparison in the course of a 
police investigation, providing information in accordance with the 
Privacy Act 1993, and administering the databank. Additional 
safeguards have also been incorporated in the dual request provisions 
to meet another objection by the Privacy Commissioner. The police may 
make a databank request to a person in conjunction with a suspect 
request. To ensure that any person subject to a dual request 
understands that a sample is requ ired for both i nvest i gative and 
Above n 25, 18. 
Above n 112, 36. 
Submission to the Just ice and Law Re-form Committee, 1995. 
170 
171 
52 
databank purposes, the police must observe the separate information 
and notice requirements that apply to the two procedures. In 
addition, the person requested must be specifically informed that she 
or he may consent to the taking of a blood sample in response to both 
requests or only one, or may refuse both. 
The Act also enables the police to use the databank for scanning the 
profiles of any other persons who agree to provide a sample. The only 
criterium for inclusion is the person's consent. The Privacy 
Commissioner was concerned that a person who is willing to supply a 
sample for the purposes of a specific investigation, may, in the 
spirit of cooperation with the investigation, feel reluctant to or 
unab 1 e to refuse the other request for the prof i 1 e to be in the 
databank. In cases where the police are conducting a large sweep (eg 
"Operation Park 11 ) 170 and a large number of people are being 
approached for elimination purposes, there is obviously the 
opportunity to gather a large number of samples from persons who are 
entirely innocent of offences. 
4 Strict controls 
Because DNA can be used for many more purposes than simple 
identification (eg determining a person 's suscept i bi l i ty to diseases, 
behavioural patterns etc), it has been argued that it is necessary 
to have comprehensive legislation to provide for both informed 
consent in the taking of samples and for tight restriction regarding 
the uses to which they are put. There is the fear that databanking 
by government without strict controls would allow the state 
unprecedented scope to pry into its citizens' 1 i ves. 171 Cameron 
Price comments that DNA based identification databanking intrudes 
into civil liberties. He points out that the initial limitations on 
access to the databank can be amended by a mere simple majority vote. 
Over 1,000 people voluntarily provided blood samples for DNA analysis. 
ED Shap, ro ML We, nberg "DNA Databan k 1 ng: The Dangerous Eros, on of Pr, vacy" ( 1990) 
38 Cl eve 1 and State LR 455, 4 79. See a 1 so PL Bereano "The Impact of DNA based 
Ident1f1cat1on Systems on C1v1l Liberties" ,n R 8 111,ngs DNA on Tr,al, 119. See 
al;so NL Wiler, S Stavsk1, R Lewont,n, PR 8111,ngs "DNA Databank,ng and the Public 
Interest" ,n PR 81 11,ngs (ed) DNA on Trial 141. 
53 
"Once a databank is established for a particular group such as sex 
offenders, what protection do we have against pressures to extend it 
yet to other groups such as insurers, employers, medical research 
institutes and other individuals ar inst i tut i ons who claim they have 
need to access the informat i on? 11 172 These fears are probably not 
justified considering that only DNA profiles, which can be used for 
little else than simple identification, will be stored and not the 
genetic material from which they are derived. 
172 
173 
VII CONCLUSION 
Since the discovery of DNA profiling in 1985 and the landmark case 
of Pitchfork in England in 1987, many violent crimes have been solved 
through the use of this powerful forensic tool. New Zealand has 
fo 11 owed the developments overseas and embraced the use of DNA 
profiling in criminal investigations with confidence and enthusiasm. 
The enactment of the Criminal Investigat i ons (Blood Samples) Act 1995 
is a manifestation of this enthusiasm, and in providing for 
compulsion orders and the reasonable use of force, New Zealand has 
boldly taken the lead instead of waiting to follow legal developments 
in other countries. 
Despite the benefits of DNA profiling one should still bear in mind 
the potential for grave injustice occurring if a crit i cal approach 
is not adopted by both lawyers and forensic scientists. The dangers 
are summed up by Andrew Hall as follows: "The risk is that it [DNA 
profiling] becomes a black box into which the scientific evidence is 
placed at one end and the verdict in the criminal case is produced 
at the other" .173 
CA Price "DNA , The Modern Fi ngerpr i nt" i n FWM McE l rea ( ed) Re-Th1nk11'1g Cr1mina1 
Just i ce vo l II , 1 5. 
Above n 88 , 203 . 
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